For the Forgiveness of Sins : A Comparative Constitutional Analysis and Defense of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege in the United States and Australia by Semonin, James Grant
Journal of Legislation 
Volume 47 Issue 2 Article 8 
5-19-2021 
"For the Forgiveness of Sins": A Comparative Constitutional 
Analysis and Defense of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege in the United 
States and Australia 
James Grant Semonin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg 
Recommended Citation 
James G. Semonin, "For the Forgiveness of Sins": A Comparative Constitutional Analysis and Defense of 
the Clergy-Penitent Privilege in the United States and Australia, 47 J. Legis. 156 (2021). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg/vol47/iss2/8 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Legislation at NDLScholarship. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Legislation by an authorized editor of NDLScholarship. For more information, 
please contact lawdr@nd.edu. 
"For the Forgiveness of Sins": A Comparative Constitutional Analysis and Defense 
of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege in the United States and Australia 
Cover Page Footnote 
J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, Class of 2022. I would like to thank Professor 
Richard Garnett and the editors of the Notre Dame Journal of Legislation for their guidance, comments, 
and assistance regarding the production of this Note. 










“FOR THE FORGIVENESS OF SINS”: A COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND DEFENSE OF THE 





James Grant Semonin* 
 
 
What is striking me about [efforts to curb the clergy-penitent privilege is that 
legislators are] now going beyond public institutions and reaching very deeply 
into the interior life of the Church—how we manage our sacramental life—and 
that kind of aggression, that sort of violation of religious liberty . . . should 
concern not just Catholics but anyone who is committed to . . . political values.1 
 
 INTRODUCTION  
   
The clergy-penitent privilege2 is a long-recognized rule of evidence which 
protects from judicial inquiry evidence of confidential communications between 
penitents and their clerics.3  It “recognizes the human need to disclose to a spiritual 
counselor, in total and absolute confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts or 
thoughts and to receive priestly consolation and guidance in return.”4  While 
testimonial privileges are generally disfavored, the clergy-penitent privilege is “a 
 
* J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, Class of 2022.  I would like to thank Professor 
Richard Garnett and the editors of the Notre Dame Journal of Legislation for their guidance, comments, and 
assistance regarding the production of this Note.  
1 Bishop Robert Barron, Bishop Barron on California’s Attack on Confession, YOUTUBE (May 22, 2019), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bfwrf7zhOT0; see also CATECHISM OF THE CATH. CHURCH, ¶¶ 1441, 1446 
(noting Church teaching that only God forgives sins, but because “Christ entrusted to his apostles the ministry 
of reconciliation, bishops who are their successors, and priests, the bishops’ collaborators, continue to exercise 
this ministry”).  It is therefore through the sacrament of Holy Orders that bishops and priests are enabled to 
forgive sins “in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.”  Id. ¶ 1461.  
2 For the purposes of this Note, I use the term “clergy-penitent privilege,” primarily because the privilege 
is not limited to a particular religion or denomination.  See e.g., UNIF. R. EVID. 505.  It is important to note, 
however, that the term used to describe the privilege varies among scholars and jurisdictions.  See e.g., In re 
Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 377 n.2 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Lightman v. Flaum, 761 N.E.2d 1027, 
1030 n.* (N.Y. 2001) (noting that prior cases in the same jurisdiction have referred to the privilege using 
different terms including “priest-penitent” privilege, “clergy-penitent” privilege, “minister-penitent” privilege, 
“cleric-congregant” privilege, and “clergy-communicant” privilege) (citations omitted).  
3 Ronald J. Colombo, Note, Forgive Us Our Sins: The Inadequacies of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 73 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 225, 225 (1998).  
4 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).  
  




public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational 
means for ascertaining the truth.”5  The privilege has been recognized since as early 
as the fifth century, with its origins in the Catholic sacrament of Penance, as codified 
in the Canon Law of the Roman Catholic Church.6  While the privilege is not limited 
to Catholic priests,7 this Note focuses on the Catholic Church specifically.  This is 
due in part to the fact that the privilege is well-exemplified in the context of disputes 
regarding criminal conduct disclosed during a sacramental confession and also 
because the debate surrounding the privilege has become increasingly contentious in 
the wake of the child sexual abuse scandal in the Catholic Church.8  In response to 
this scandal, many state legislatures across the United States passed statutes making 
clerics mandatory reporters of child abuse, though not every state has done so.9  There 
were similarly strong responses in Australia as well, where, in 2012, then-Prime 
Minister, Julia Gillard, announced her decision to establish a Royal Commission to 
investigate institutional responses to child sexual abuse and to make 
recommendations regarding the states’ mandatory reporter laws.10   
At the federal level of the United States, proposals to adopt a formal rule of 
evidence regarding the clergy-penitent privilege have been rejected by Congress.11  
Nevertheless, its inclusion in the proposed rules has been deemed to support the 
notion that it has been “indelibly ensconced” in the American legal system.12  This is 
evidenced by the fact that, unlike the federal government, today, every state has 
enacted some form of the clergy-penitent privilege.13  However, each state differs in 
terms of how the privilege is defined, what communications are covered, and who 
may assert it.14  At the same time, every state has mandatory reporter statutes which 
require certain individuals to report known or suspected instances of child abuse and 
neglect.15  In this regard, states also differ as to whether clergy are enumerated as 
mandatory reporters and, if so, whether the privilege trumps the mandatory reporter 
 
5 Id. at 50 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960)).   
6 Michael J. Mazza, Comment, Should Clergy Hold the Priest-Penitent Privilege?, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 171, 
186 (1998).  
7 Clergy-Penitent Privilege, THOMSON REUTERS PRACTICAL LAW (2021) (defining the clergy-penitent 
privilege as including a “priest, minister, rabbi, or similar figure of a religious organization”).  
8 Elizabeth Mehren, Scandal Shaking Catholicism to Core, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2002), 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2002-mar-13-mn-32586-story.html; see also Laurie Goodstein & 
Sharon Otterman, Catholic Priests Abused 1,000 Children in Pennsylvania, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/us/catholic-church-sex-abuse-pennsylvania.html.  
9 Paul Winters, Comment, Whom Must the Clergy Protect? The Interests of at-Risk Children in Conflict 
with Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 187, 189 (2012); see also CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, 
CLERGY AS MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (2019), 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/clergymandated.pdf [hereinafter CHILD WELFARE GATEWAY I]. 
10 Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, ROYAL COMM’NS, 
https://www.royalcommission.gov.au/royal-commission-institutional-responses-child-sexual-abuse (last visited 
Sept. 10, 2020). 
11 FED. R. EVID. 506, 56 F.R.D. 183, 247 (proposed 1973). 
12 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 381 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Gillock, 445 
U.S. 360, 368 (1980)).  
13 Varner v. Stovall, 500 F.3d 491, 495 (6th Cir. 2007). 
14 F. Robert Radel, II & Andrew A. Labbe, The Clergy-Penitent Privilege: An Overview, GROELLE & 
SALMON, P.A., https://www.gspalaw.com/the-clergy-penitent-privilege-an-overview/ (last visited Sept. 10, 
2020).  
15 CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (2019), 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/manda.pdf [hereinafter CHILD WELFARE GATEWAY II]. 
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status or vice versa.16  Between 2019 and 2021 alone, California, Utah, and North 
Dakota have been among states who have attempted to subordinate the privilege 
regarding its conflict with mandatory reporter statutes.17  At the international level, 
the same issues are being addressed in Australia, where state legislatures have become 
increasingly active in efforts to curb the privilege.  In 2020 alone, several of the eight 
Australian states passed legislation requiring clergy to report instances of child abuse 
revealed during a sacramental confession.18   
These legislative developments have brought renewed interest to the clergy-
penitent privilege and its underpinnings.  On the one hand, it is indisputable that 
governments maintain a legitimate interest in curbing child abuse, and that abuse by 
clergy is a problem at both the national and international levels.19  On the other hand, 
both the United States and Australia recognize the essential right to the free exercise 
of religion.20  Indeed, it has been said that freedom of religion is among the earliest 
and most enduring human rights to be recognized internationally.21  Therefore, its 
import in these matters of individual exercise and church governance cannot be 
understated.   
In the Catholic context, priests may be held accountable under state law 
mandatory reporter requirements and the canon law of the Catholic Church, which 
makes clear that “the sacramental seal is inviolable.”22  Under the canon law, a priest 
who betrays the confidentiality of penitential communications made during a 
sacramental confession faces immediate excommunication from the Catholic 
Church.23  Therefore, the clergy-penitent privilege brings two competing interests to 
the fore, namely, the state’s legitimate interest in obtaining evidence against 
suspected child abusers and the right of the individual, both cleric and penitent alike, 
to freely exercise their religion.24   
This Note argues that recent national and international legislative efforts to 
curb the clergy-penitent privilege have failed to adequately account for the right to 
the free exercise of religion.  Thus, this Note echoes the notion that a uniform 
approach which both properly limits the scope of the privilege while maintaining due 
deference for legitimate religious belief and practice is necessary.  Part I of this Note 
discusses the purpose, history, and structure of the clergy-penitent privilege generally, 
its historical treatment in the United States and Australia, and its relation to religious 
freedom embodied in the United States and Australian Constitutions.  Part II discusses 
how the privilege has been treated in the modern era, including the most recent 
 
16 CHILD WELFARE GATEWAY I, supra note 9. 
17 See S.B. 360, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019); see also H.B. 90, 2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Utah 2020); 
S.B. 2180, 67th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2021).  
18 Western Australian Legislative Committee Recommends Preserving Confessional Seal, CATH. NEWS 
AGENCY (Sept. 12, 2020), https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/western-australian-legislative-
committee-recommends-preserving-confessional-seal-99410.  
19 Nicole Winfield, A Global Look at the Catholic Church’s Sex Abuse Problem, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 
21, 2019), https://apnews.com/8cb4daf509464bad8c13ef35d44a0fc5. 
20 U.S. CONST. amend. I; Australian Constitution s 116.   
21 ANTHONY GRAY, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND SECTION 116 OF THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION: WOULD 
A BANNING OF THE HIJAB OR BURQA BE CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID?, 2011 F. ON PUB. POL’Y 1, 2 (2011), 
https://forumonpublicpolicy.com/vol2011.no2/archivevol2011.no2/gray.pdf. 
22 1983 CODE c.983, § 1.  
23 1983 CODE c.1388, § 1; see also Mayeux v. Charlet, 203 So. 3d 1030, 1037 (La. 2016).   
24 See Jane E. Mayes, Note, Striking Down the Clergyman-Communicant Privilege Statutes: Let Free 
Exercise of Religion Govern, 62 IND. L.J. 397, 397 (1987).  
  




legislative efforts to alter the privilege concerning its relation to mandatory reporter 
laws in the United States and Australia.  Part III analyzes the constitutionality of 
recent legislative efforts in the United States and Australia with an eye towards the 
substantial burden these developments have imposed concerning matters of church 
governance as well as the individual exercise of clerics and penitents alike.  Part IV 
then discusses a proposal for a more uniform approach to the clergy-penitent privilege 
that keeps mandatory reporter requirements incumbent upon clergy by limiting the 
scope of the privilege while also ensuring that such mandates will not infringe upon 
legitimate religious beliefs and practices protected by the United States and 
Australian Constitutions. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND  
 
A.  EARLY CHURCH ORIGINS OF THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE AND THE 
COMPANION CLERGY-PENITENT PRIVILEGE   
 
In the Catholic Church, the sacrament of Penance is among the seven 
sacraments which are central pillars of the faith today.25  However, it is critical to note 
that the sacrament is not a modern phenomenon.  Indeed, confession has been a part 
of the Christian religious tradition throughout history and reference to the Holy Bible 
evidences its significance.26  Jesus Christ proclaimed to his Apostles that, “[i]f you 
forgive the sins of any, they are forgiven them; if you retain the sins of any, they are 
retained.”27  In Catholic theology, this apostolic authority conferred by Christ 
succeeds the Apostles and has been passed down to the early church fathers as well 
as the priests and bishops of the Church today.28  Between the third and fifth centuries, 
the paramount importance of confidentiality concerning penitential communications 
began to take hold.29  Indeed, Theodore of Mopsuestia, a fifth-century theologian and 
bishop, said: 
 
It behooves us, therefore, to draw near to the priests in great confidence and to 
reveal to them our sins; and those priests, with all diligence, solicitude, and love, 
and in accord with the regulations . . . will grant healing to sinners.  [The priests] 
 
25 See CATECHISM OF THE CATH. CHURCH, supra note 1, ¶ 1210 (listing the seven sacraments of the 
Catholic Church, including Baptism, Confirmation, the Eucharist, Penance, the Anointing of the Sick, Holy 
Orders, and Matrimony).  
26 See, e.g., JOHN C. BUSH & WILLIAM HAROLD TIEMANN, THE RIGHT TO SILENCE: PRIVILEGED CLERGY 
COMMUNICATION AND THE LAW 41–42 (3d ed. 1989) (referencing biblical origins of confession in the New 
Testament); see also 1 John 1:9 (“If we confess our sins, He is faithful and just and will forgive us our sins and 
purify us from all unrighteousness.”); John 20:21–23 (“If you forgive the sins of any, they are forgiven; if you 
retain the sins of any, they are retained.”); Numbers 5:5–7 (“The Lord spoke to Moses, saying: Speak to the 
Israelites—When a man or woman wrongs another, breaking faith with the Lord, that person incurs guilt and 
shall confess the sin that has been committed.  The person shall make full restitution for the wrong, adding one 
fifth to it, and giving it to the one who was wronged.”). 
27 Robert John Araujo, S.J., International Tribunals and Rules of Evidence: The Case for Respecting and 
Preserving the “Priest-Penitent Privilege” Under International Law, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 639, 643 (2000) 
(citing John 20:23).  
28 What the Early Church Believed: Apostolic Succession, CATH. ANSWERS (Aug. 10, 2004), 
https://www.catholic.com/tract/apostolic-succession.  
29 Araujo, S.J., supra note 27, at 643.  
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will not disclose the things that ought not to be disclosed; rather, they will be 
silent about the things that have happened, as befits true and loving fathers who 
are bound to guard the shame of their children while striving to heal their 
bodies.30 
 
Likewise, Pope St. Leo I, Bishop of Rome from 440 to 461, recommended 
that penitential communications take place in private and directed priests to refrain 
from publicly revealing penitents’ sins.31  By the end of the ninth century, the pope 
promulgated an order aimed at codifying these directives, and in 1215, after the 
Fourth Lateran Council convened, the Church adopted the absolute obligation of 
secrecy regarding penitential communications, otherwise known as the seal of 
confession.32  This obligation was later affirmed by the Council of Trent in 1551.33  
The importance of secrecy in the context of penitential communications lays the 
foundation upon which the sacramental confession and its accompanying clergy-
penitent privilege arise.  
Inextricably related to confession, the clergy-penitent privilege derives from 
pre-Reformation Europe and the canon law of the Catholic Church.34  Under the 
canon law, Catholics are to confess their sins to a priest in what is known as the formal 
sacrament of Penance.35  Specifically, the canon law provides that, “[a] member of 
the Christian faithful is obliged to confess in kind and number all grave sins 
committed after baptism ….”36  If a penitent wishes “to receive the salvific remedy 
of the sacrament of penance,” then he must reject his sins and approach the sacrament 
with a “purpose of amendment.”37  Many criminal acts, including the sexual assault 
of children, constitute grave sins that must be confessed.38   
The priest is tasked with administering the sacrament as “a minister of divine 
justice and mercy . . . .”39  Therefore, upon hearing a penitent’s confession, the priest 
imposes “salutary and suitable penances in accord with the quality and number of 
sins, taking into account the condition of the penitent,” which the penitent must then 
fulfill.40  It is a traditional form of penance for the penitent to be asked to spend time 
in prayer.  Still, other tangible forms of penance, such as directives to visit sacred 
spaces, fast for a period of time, return stolen goods, restore another’s reputation, or 
 
30 Mazza, supra note 6, at 174 n.20 (quoting WILLIAM A. JURGENS, THE FAITH OF THE EARLY FATHERS 
83–84 (1979)).  
31 Id. (citing JURGENS, supra note 30, at 272–73).  
32 Araujo, S.J., supra note 27, at 645.  
33 Id.  
34 Lori Lee Brocker, Sacred Secrets: The Clergy-Penitent Privilege Finds its Way into the News, 57 OR. 
ST. B. BULL. 15 (Oct. 1996).  
35 Id.  For the purposes of this Note, I refer to the sacrament as “Penance.”  However, it is important to 
note that while this is perhaps the most formal term, the sacrament is also referred to as the sacrament of 
“reconciliation,” “confession,” “forgiveness,” and “conversion.”  CATECHISM OF THE CATH. CHURCH, supra 
note 1, ¶ 1423–24.     
36 1983 CODE c.988, §§ 1–2.  
37 1983 CODE c.987. 
38 Anthony Fisher, Let’s Be Clear: Sexual Abuse Is a Crime and a Grave Sin, W. ADVOC. (Dec. 17, 2019, 
3:00 PM), https://www.westernadvocate.com.au/story/6547773/letter-lets-be-clear-sexual-abuse-is-a-crime-
and-a-grave-sin/. 
39 1983 CODE c.978, § 1. 
40 1983 CODE c.981. 
  




pay compensation may be appropriate in some circumstances.41  At the conclusion of 
the sacramental confession, the priest recites the prayer of absolution: 
 
God, the Father of mercies,  
through the death and resurrection of his Son  
has reconciled the world to himself  
and sent the Holy Spirit among us  
for the forgiveness of sins;  
through the ministry of the Church  
may God give you pardon and peace,  
and I absolve you of your sins in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of 
the Holy Spirit.42 
 
The Church teaches that “[t]he effect of this sacrament is deliverance from sin,” and 
“reconciliation with God . . . .”43  In this regard, it is significant that, in Catholic 
theology, penitential communications involve the confession of sins to the priest, who 
stands in persona Christi—to communicate a pardon which God alone can give.44  In 
this light, confession is “not so much an encounter with the priest.  It is an encounter 
with Christ through the sacramental mediation of the priest.”45  Thus, “the priest has 
no mortal remembrance of what has been confessed, but rather possesses knowledge 
meant solely for God’s ears.”46    
It is in the context of this sacramental framework that the clergy-penitent 
privilege first arose.  The canon law provides that “[t]he sacramental seal is 
inviolable,” and that “it is absolutely forbidden for a [priest] to betray in any way a 
penitent in words or in any manner and for any reason.”47  Furthermore, “[a priest] is 
prohibited completely from using knowledge acquired from confession to the 
detriment of the penitent even when any danger of revelation is excluded.”48  If a 
priest divulges the contents of a penitential communication, then he faces immediate 
excommunication from the Catholic Church.49  Therefore, laws aimed at limiting the 
availability of the clergy-penitent privilege place clerics in a position wherein they 
must choose between allegiance to government law or divine law.  The prevailing 
sentiment among clergy in the Church is that “[p]riests will . . .  suffer punishment, 
even martyrdom, rather than break the seal of confession.”50  As discussed further 
infra Part III.A, scholars have rightly argued that legislation which permits clergy to 
 
41 Edward McNamara, Appropriate Penances, ETERNAL WORD TELEVISION NETWORK (EWTN) (Sept. 2, 
2008), https://www.ewtn.com/catholicism/library/appropriate-penances-4438; see also CATECHISM OF THE 
CATH. CHURCH, supra note 1, ¶ 1459. 
42 CATECHISM OF THE CATH. CHURCH, supra note 1, ¶ 1449.  
43 Edward J. Hanna, Penance, CATH. ANSWERS, https://www.catholic.com/encyclopedia/penance (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2020).  
44 POPE ST. JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION “RECONCILIATO ET PAENITENTIA” (1984).   
45 Barron, supra note 1.  
46 Anthony Merlino, Comment, Tightening the Seal: Protecting the Catholic Confessional from 
Unprotective Priest-Penitent Privileges, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 655, 746–47 (2002).  
47 1983 CODE c.983, § 1. 
48 1983 CODE c.984, § 1. 
49 1983 CODE c.1388, § 1; see also Mayeux v. Charlet, 203 So. 3d 1030, 1037 (La. 2016). 
50 Rob Taylor & Francis X. Rocca, New Laws Require Priests to Break the ‘Seal of Confession,’ WALL 
ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2018, 9:37 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-laws-require-priests-to-break-the-seal-of-
confession-1533303462. 
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be faced with such a dichotomy likely constitutes an infringement of the individual 
right to the free exercise of religion.51  
 
B.  THE RISE OF THE CLERGY-PENITENT PRIVILEGE: FROM ROME TO ENGLAND  
 
Before the Reformation, Roman Catholicism was the national religion of 
England.  The laws of England and the dictates of the Catholic faith were closely 
intertwined because priests and bishops staffed the English courts.52  Scholars have 
surmised that it is probably for this reason that the rulers of England respected the 
sacrament of Penance and did not interfere with the seal of confession.53  Thus, it has 
been said that the clergy-penitent privilege was adopted into English common law 
from the canon law, though there is some disagreement among scholars as to the 
degree to which this was true.54  Nevertheless, the privilege did not only garner 
support from the religious but from secularists as well.  Indeed, English jurist and 
utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham recognized the social utility in maintaining 
the clergy-penitent privilege, including the various restorative and therapeutic 
benefits of guaranteeing the confidentiality of penitential communications.55  
Although he was an atheist, Bentham displayed a concern for religious liberty and 
wrote in the early nineteenth century that if a cleric were subject to testify regarding 
the contents of penitential communications, then “it would become a matter of course 
for the plaintiff or prosecutor . . . to summon [the priest] to appear as a witness.  A 
regulation to any such effect would therefore be a virtual proscription of the exercise 
of the Catholic religion.”56   
Despite this historical background, the privilege was not generally 
recognized following the Reformation.57  Indeed, in the early unreported case of R v. 
Sparkes, the court held that evidence of a defendant’s confession to a protestant 
minister was admissible.58  This view was further echoed in dicta by the court’s 
nineteenth century decisions of Wheeler v. Le Marchant and Anderson v. Bank of 
British Columbia.59  Notwithstanding this general view, the court in R v. Griffin drew 
an analogy between the attorney-client privilege and the clergy-penitent privilege in 
asserting that evidence of spiritual communications ought not to be given.  However, 
it noted that its view was not grounded in any rule of law.60  To the extent it was still 
recognized by courts, English statutes passed to limit the practice of the Catholic 
 
51 See Caroline Incledon, Note, The Constitutionality of Broadening Clergy Penitent Privilege Statutes, 53 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 515, 537, 539 (2016).  
52 Lennard K. Whittaker, The Priest-Penitent Privilege: Its Constitutionality and Doctrine, 13 REGENT U. 
L. REV. 145, 146 (2000).  
53 Araujo, S.J., supra note 27, at 649. 
54 See BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 26, at 49.  
55 See JEREMY BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 589–91 
(John Bowring ed., 1843). 
56 JEREMY BENTHAM, Exclusion Continued––Causes for Which It Is Proper or Not, According to 
Circumstances, in 6 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 169 (John Bowring ed., 1843). 
57 Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1958).  
58 Anthony Gray, Is the Seal of the Confessional Protected by Constitutional or Common Law?, 44 
MONASH U. L. REV. 112, 122 (2018).  
59 Id. at 123 n.58 (first citing Wheeler v. Le Marchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675, 68; then citing Anderson v. 
Bank of British Columbia (1876) 2 Ch D 644, 651).   
60 Id. at 123. 
  




religion effectively abrogated its presence in England.61  Nevertheless, given its 
support in early English courts and in some cases following the reformation, it is 
unsurprising that the privilege later emerged in the common law jurisdictions of the 
United States and Australia. 
 
C.  HISTORICAL TREATMENT IN THE UNITED STATES  
 
In the United States, the earliest-known common law recognition of the 
clergy-penitent privilege is the 1813 case of People v. Phillips.62  In that case, the 
New York Court of General Sessions held that a Catholic priest could not be 
compelled to testify regarding penitential communications made during a sacramental 
confession by a suspected thief.63  The court recognized that “[t]he sacraments of a 
religion are its most important elements.”64  Thus, the court stated that to compel a 
priest to testify as to the contents of confidential penitential communications would 
constitute an infringement upon his right to exercise his religion freely because 
“[s]ecrecy is of the essence of penance . . . [and] [t]o decide that the minister shall 
promulgate what he receives in confession, is to declare that there shall be no penance; 
and this important branch of Roman [C]atholic religion would be thus annihilated.”65   
Shortly after the Phillips decision, the privilege was limited by another New 
York decision in People v. Smith.66  There, the court distinguished sacramental 
confessions made to a Catholic priest, as required by the canon law of the Catholic 
Church, and communications with a Protestant minister that were not formally 
required by the religion but served as a form of spiritual guidance.67  The court 
suggested that whether the privilege was available turned not on the nature of the 
communication but instead on whether the secrecy of such communications was 
mandated by the religion in question.68  A year later, the rationale underlying the 
decision in People v. Smith was echoed in the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts when it decided Commonwealth v. Drake.69  In that case, the court 
emphasized that a confession made to a Baptist minister was not “required by any 
known ecclesiastical rule” and “without any requisition, or even solicitation,” it could 
not inure the benefit of the clergy-penitent privilege.70 
Despite the prevalence of this interpretation, the New York legislature 
abrogated the People v. Smith decision in 1828 and passed the first-ever clergy-
penitent privilege statute in America, which effectively extended the privilege to other 
 
61 Richard Nolan, The Law of the Seal of Confession, 13 CATH. ENCYCLOPEDIA (1912).  
62 People v. Phillips (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813), reproduced in Privileged Communications to Clergymen, 
1 CATH. LAW. 199 (1955). 
63 Id.  
64 Id.  
65 Id.  
66 2 Rogers’ N.Y. City-Hall Recorder 77 (Ct. Oyer & Term. 1817), reproduced in Privileged 
Communications to Clergymen, 1 CATH. LAW. 199 (1955). 
67 Id.  
68 Radel II & Labbe, supra note 14. 
69 See Jude O. Ezeanokwasa, The Priest-Penitent Privilege Revisited: A Reply to the Statutes of Abrogation, 
9 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41, 58–59 (2014) (discussing Commonwealth v. Drake, 15 Mass. 161 
(1818)).  
70 Drake, 15 Mass. at 162.  
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religious denominations.  The New York statute stated that, “[n]o minister of the 
gospel, or priest of any denomination whatsoever, shall be allowed to disclose any 
confessions made to him in his professional character, in the course of discipline 
enjoined by the rules of practice of such denomination.”71  This statute greatly 
influenced the legislative development of the clergy-penitent privilege in America.72  
By 1904, twenty-five states had followed suit in statutorily adopting their own forms 
of the privilege, and by 1963, another nineteen states codified it.73  By 1991, every 
state in the union and the District of Columbia had a clergy-penitent privilege 
statute.74 
The most notable federal legislative effort was Proposed Federal Rule of 
Evidence 506, which the Supreme Court Advisory Committee adopted in 1972.75  
Notably, the proposed rule adopted an expansive view of “clergyman” such that the 
privilege would cover any “individual reasonably believed” to be acting as a 
“functionary of a religious organization.”76  Although Congress did not expressly 
adopt the proposed rule, it did not foreclose its use on a case-by-case basis.77  
Therefore, many federal courts have used the proposed and rejected Rule 506 as a 
reference point in dealing with cases involving the clergy-penitent privilege.78  
Indeed, it has been said that, “[t]he inclusion of the [clergy-penitent privilege] in the 
proposed rules, taken together with its uncontroversial nature, strongly suggests that 
the privilege is, in the words of the Supreme Court ‘indelibly ensconced’ in the 
American common law.”79 
 
71 Seward Reese, Confidential Communications to the Clergy, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 55, 57 (1963) (citing REV. 
STAT. OF N.Y. tit. 3, § 72 (1829)).  
72 Id.  
73 26 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., 26 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 
5612 (1992); see also Mazza, supra note 6, at 182.     
74 Ezeanokwasa, supra note 69, at 60.  
75 Proposed FED. R. EVID. 506, 56 F.R.D. 183, 247 (1973).  The Communications to Clergymen stated: 
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule:  
(1) A “clergyman” is a minister, priest, rabbi, or other similar functionary of a religious 
organization, or an individual reasonably believed so to be by the person consulting 
him.  
(2) A communication is “confidential” if made privately and not intended for further 
disclosure except to other persons present in furtherance of the purpose of the 
communication 
(b) General Rule of privilege. A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to 
prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication by the person to a 
clergyman in his professional character as spiritual adviser.  
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the person, by his 
guardian or conservator, or by his personal representative if he is deceased. The 
clergyman may claim the privilege on behalf of the person. His authority to do so is 
presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 
Id. 
76 Id.  
77 The report by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary concerning the proposed rules stated: 
It should be clearly understood that . . . the action of Congress [in accepting Rule 501 and 
rejecting the other proposed rules] should not be understood as disapproving any 
recognition of . . . any . . . of the enumerated privileges contained in the Supreme Court 
rules.  Rather, our action should be understood as reflecting the view that the recognition 
of a privilege based on a confidential relationship and other privileges should be 
determined on a case-by-case basis.   
S. Rep. No. 93-1277, 93rd Cong. 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News 7051, 7059.  
78 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 380 (3d Cir. 1990).  
79 Id. at 381 (citing United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 368 (1980)).  
  




The first reported federal case recognizing the clergy-penitent privilege by 
operation of the common law was the 1958 case of Mullen v. United States.80  In 
concurrence, Judge Fahy opined that there was a common law basis upon which 
“reason and experience” would permit the court to find that the clergy-penitent 
privilege applied in a case regarding spiritual counseling offered by a minister.81  
After the Mullen case, the clergy-penitent privilege was again implicitly recognized 
in United States v. Wells.82  Citing Mullen, the court recognized that confidential 
penitential communications were protected by the clergy-penitent privilege at 
common law and thus, because a letter contained “no hint that its contents were to be 
kept secret, or that its purpose was to obtain religious or other counsel, advice, solace, 
absolution or ministration,” it was admissible.83  The Supreme Court has effectively 
ratified the clergy-penitent privilege in dicta repeatedly throughout the last century as 
well.  In United States v. Nixon, the Court noted that, “an attorney or a priest may not 
be required to disclose what has been revealed in professional confidence.”84  
Similarly, in Trammel v. United States,85 the Court stated that, “the [clergy-penitent 
privilege] recognizes the human need to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and 
absolute confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts or thoughts and to receive 
priestly consolation and guidance in return.”86   
Other legal institutes and organizations have also recognized the privilege 
throughout American history.  In the early 1940s, the American Law Institute drafted 
its Model Code of Evidence to include the clergy-penitent privilege.87  The privilege 
was also included when the Uniform Rules of Evidence were originally published in 
1953.88  This historical landscape evidences the reverence with which the privilege 
has been viewed throughout American history.  This reverence had been largely 
maintained until the recent legislative efforts discussed infra Part II.A emerged.  
 
D.  HISTORICAL TREATMENT IN AUSTRALIA   
 
In Australia, case law has played less of a role in the development of the 
clergy-penitent privilege than statutory efforts.  Indeed, it has been widely argued that 
there is no clergy-penitent privilege at common law recognized in Australia.89  
Nevertheless, there have been comments in dicta lending support to its recognition.  
In the 1940 case of McGuinness v Attorney-General, the Court stated that the 
relationship between “priest and penitent” was among the few “where paramount 
considerations of general policy appeared to require that there should be a special 
 
80 Id. at 381–82; see also Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1958).  
81 Mullen, 263 F.2d at 277.  
82 United States v. Wells, 446 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1971).  
83 Id. at 4.  
84 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).  
85 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 45 (1980).  
86 Id. at 51.  
87 Norman Abrams, Addressing the Tension Between the Clergy-Communicant Privilege and the Duty to 
Report Child Abuse in State Statutes, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1127, 1131 (2003); see also MODEL CODE OF EVID. R. 
219 (1942).  
88 Abrams, supra note 87, at 1131; see also UNIF. R. EVID. 29.  
89 Patrick Van Esch & Linda Jean Van Esch, The Australian Priest-Penitent Privilege: Are They 
Protected?, 6 J. POL. & L. 90 (2013). 
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privilege.”90  Similarly, in Baker v Campbell, one justice said “[t]he need for 
preservation of . . . priest-penitent confidentiality seems to be as strong as the need 
for preservation of lawyer-client confidentiality in the area of advice.”91  While these 
jurists denied the existence of a common law clergy-penitent privilege, they 
recognized its privileged status as a largely statutory creature in Australia.   
Indeed, from a statutory perspective, the twentieth century saw significant 
legislative development when four Australian states, including New South Wales,92 
the Northern Territory,93 Tasmania,94 and Victoria,95 joined the Commonwealth in 
adopting legislation which provided for the clergy-penitent privilege.  In 1972, the 
Commonwealth Government expressed a desire for uniform evidence legislation 
across Australia in the Evidence Bill 1972.96  However, Queensland and Western 
Australia refrained from joining the movement towards uniform evidence 
legislation.97  Instead, those states favored judicial discretion regarding penitential 
communications, as recommended by the Australian Law Reform Commission. 98  
Although New South Wales did not expressly provide for a clergy-penitent privilege, 
it did provide for a professional communications privilege, which could be used to 
cover penitential communications.99 
Of those states who historically provided for the clergy-penitent privilege, 
each limited its scope to formal ritual confessions.100  However, in R v. Lynch, Justice 
Crisp suggested that the statutory scope of the privilege could be viewed more 
expansively as protecting not only ritual confessions but also confidential 
communications concerning other forms of spiritual counseling.101  Each of the acts 
extended the privilege to “clergy of any church or religious denomination.”102  While 
 
90 A. Keith Thompson, Religious Confession Privilege at Common Law: A Historical Analysis, MURDOCH 
UNIV. 267 (2006) (quoting McGuiness v. Attorney-General (Vic) (1940) 63 CLR 73).  
91 Id. at 271 (quoting Baker v. Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 75).  
92 See Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 127(1).  “A person who is or was a member of the clergy of any church 
or religious denomination is entitled to refuse to divulge that a religious confession was made, or the contents 
of a religious confession made, to the person when a member of the clergy.”  Id.  “In this section: religious 
confession means a confession made by a person to a member of the clergy in the member’s professional 
capacity according to the ritual of the church or religious denomination concerned.”  Id. at 127(4).  
93 See Evidence Act 1939 (NT) s 12(1) (stating that clergymen of any church or religious denomination 
shall not divulge any confessions made to them as a professional in any proceeding without the consent of the 
person who made the confession).  
94 See Evidence Act 1910 (Tas) s 96(1) (“No clergyman of any church or religious denomination shall 
divulge in any proceeding any confession made to him in his professional character, except with the consent of 
the person who made such confession.”).  
95 See Evidence Act 1958 (Vic) s 28.  The Victoria statute read:  
No clergyman of any church or religious denomination shall without the consent of the 
person making the confession divulge in any suit action or proceeding whether civil or 
criminal any confession made to him in his professional character according to the usage 
of the church or religious denomination to which he belongs.  
Id. 
96 Michael A. Perella, Should Western Australia Adopt an Evidentiary Privilege Protecting 
Communications Given in Religious Confessions?, 4 MURDOCH UNIV. ELEC. J. L. 3 (1997).   
97 Van Esch & Van Esch, supra note 89, at 91.  
98 Id. 
99 Id.  
100 Id. at 90.  
101 Renae Mabey, The Priest-Penitent Privilege in Australia and Its Consequences, 18 MURDOCH UNIV. 
ELEC. J. L. 51, 53 (2006). 
102 Queensland Law Reform Comm’n, The Protection of Statements Made to Religiously Ordained 
Officials, Report No. 41 (1991) at 4.  
  




these statutes took a broad view of clergy as well as the types of communications 
covered, they did attempt to at least minimally narrow the scope of the privilege by 
making it available only where clergy were acting in their “professional character.”103  
Within this framework, the Queensland Law Reform Commission posited that 
penitential communications in the context of a sacramental confession in the Catholic 
Church were certainly privileged by those statutes.104   
While these acts shared important similarities, they differed regarding 
whether the priest or penitent could assert the privilege.105  First, New South Wales 
allowed the privilege to be claimed by any individual who fell within the statutory 
definition of clergy, whether past or present.106  Meanwhile, the other jurisdictions 
limited the privilege to those who were currently acting as clergy.107  Second, the 
Evidence Acts of the Northern Territory and Victoria accorded the privilege to the 
penitent.108  In contrast, the privilege belonged to the clergy under the Evidence Acts 
of New South Wales, Tasmania, and the Commonwealth.109  These legislative 
developments further exemplify the longstanding international recognition that an 
evidentiary privilege for clergy-penitent communications is an appropriate 
mechanism for respecting individual religious exercise.  Like the United States, 
however, recent legislative efforts in Australia discussed infra Part II.B have largely 
departed from this recognition.  For this reason, it is necessary to consider how the 
United States and Australia approach religious freedom generally, and whether such 
a departure is consonant with that constitutional pillar. 
  
E.  THE RELIGION CLAUSES IN THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIAN 
CONSTITUTIONS  
 
i.  The First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Its 
Jurisprudence  
 
In the United States, the First Amendment to the Constitution was adopted 
to curtail legislative power “to interfere with the individual’s freedom to believe, to 
worship, and to express himself in accordance with the dictates of his own 
conscience.”110  The Free Exercise Clause111 limits the ability of the government to 
curb religious beliefs and practices.  Equally important in crafting proper legislation, 
the Establishment Clause112 prohibits the government from passing legislation which 
favors religious belief over non-belief,113 or gives preference to one denomination 
 
103 Id.  
104 Id.  
105 Mabey, supra note 101, at 53; see also R v. Lynch [1954] Tas SR 47 at 48.  
106 Queensland Law Reform Comm’n, supra note 102, at 8.  
107 Id.  
108 Mabey, supra note 101, at 53.  
109 Id. at 55.  
110 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985).  
111 “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof.”  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
112 Id.      
113 See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 251–53 (1982).  
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over another.114  Under the doctrine of incorporation, the states are similarly bound 
to uphold these guarantees via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.115  It is largely undisputed that legislation which protects or abrogates 
the clergy-penitent privilege implicates each of these clauses.116  With respect to the 
Free Exercise Clause, it is generally agreed that religious belief is unequivocally 
protected, while religious actions may be subject to further confirmation as challenges 
arise.117 
Early United States Supreme Court cases addressing the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment held that religious belief did not excuse practices 
which violated the criminal law.118  Over time, however, persons were afforded 
religious belief protection from generally applicable laws.119  While the Court has 
stated that the government may not “force anyone to . . . say or believe anything in 
conflict with his religious tenets,”120 it has permitted some interference.  In Sherbert 
v. Verner,121 the Supreme Court stated that the state must demonstrate a “compelling 
interest” to justify a law which substantially infringes on religious exercise.122  If such 
a compelling interest is proven, then the legislation must also be “narrowly tailored” 
to achieve that objective and constitute the “least restrictive means” of doing so.123  
This strict scrutiny analysis serves to ensure the protection of the fundamental right 
to freely exercise one’s religion.   
In Sherbert, the Court held that the state had not demonstrated a compelling 
state interest to justify the denial of unemployment benefits to a person who was 
unavailable to work on Saturdays due to her religious beliefs.124  Similarly, in 
Wisconsin v. Yoder,125 the Court held that the state’s interest in compelling Amish 
children to attend school beyond the eighth grade was outweighed by the right of 
parents to freely exercise their religion.126  In that case, the Court noted that the state’s 
interest was still served in the absence of that mandate and if it were to be enforced, 
it could have significant consequences for the longstanding Amish religious practice 
and way of life.127 
In 1990, the Supreme Court’s standard for evaluating free exercise cases 
shifted with its decision in Employment Division v. Smith.128  There, the Court stated 
that a law which burdens religious exercise is permissible under the Free Exercise 
 
114 Id. at 244–47.  
115 Ezeanokwasa, supra note 69, at 5859; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.   
116 Winters, supra note 9, at 194; see also Incledon, supra note 51, at 524–25.  
117 Winters, supra note 9, at 194; see e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (holding that a 
Mormon could not use his religious beliefs as a justification for committing overt acts in violation of a state 
statute which criminalized polygamy). 
118 David S. Bogen, The Religion Clauses and Freedom of Speech in Australia and the United States: 
Incidental Restrictions and Generally Applicable Laws, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 53, 83 (1997); see also Reynolds, 98 
U.S. at 166–67 (holding that a defendant could not avoid prosecution for violating state polygamy law on the 
basis of his Mormon beliefs).      
119 Bogen, supra note 118, at 83.  
120 Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961).  
121 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).  
122 Id. at 406.  
123 Am. Civ. Liberties Union v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181, 190 (3d Cir. 2008).  
124 Sherbert, 366 U.S. at 403.  
125 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).      
126 Id. at 234.  
127 Id. 
128 Winters, supra note 9, at 195.  
  




Clause when it is neutral and generally applicable.129  Therefore, the Court said that, 
“if prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . is not the object of [the law] but merely the 
incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First 
Amendment has not been offended.”130  For that reason, the Court held that members 
of a Native American church who challenged a law prohibiting the use of peyote were 
not entitled to an exemption on the basis of its use in religious ceremonies.131  
However, if it can be shown that the law is not neutral and generally applicable, then 
it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to 
advance that interest.132   
Of course, if a statute expressly targets religion, then it is invalid.  However, 
this is not necessary to find a violation.  Even if a statute merely abrogates a 
preexisting statutory exemption for religious practices, it may not be deemed neutral 
and generally applicable.  In Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do 
Vegetal,133  the Supreme Court rejected the government’s attempt to quell a 
“longstanding exemption” from the Controlled Substances Act for the use of hoasca 
in religious sacramental practices.134  The government asserted that permitting this 
preexisting statutory exemption to go forward would “necessarily . . . undercut” the 
effectiveness of the Controlled Substances Act if it was “not uniformly applied, 
without regard to burdens on religious exercise.”135  The Court found this argument 
unpersuasive and noted that the religious exemption “has been in place since the 
outset of the Controlled Substances Act, and there is no evidence that it has ‘undercut’ 
the Government’s ability to enforce the ban.”136  On this basis, the Court held that the 
government was required to pass strict scrutiny and demonstrate a compelling interest 
“by offering evidence that granting the requested religious accommodations would 
seriously compromise its ability to” achieve its objectives in relation to the substantial 
burden imposed on the sacramental ritual at issue.137  
Even if a law is neutral and of general applicability, scholars have noted that 
Smith itself provides for two exceptions which would justify the grant of a religious 
exemption, thereby requiring strict scrutiny.138  First, Smith noted that per Sherbert, 
Yoder, and their progeny, “where the State has in place a system of individual 
exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of ‘religious hardship’ 
without compelling reason.”139  Second, referencing Yoder and similar cases, the 
Court recognized a hybrid-rights exception in which a Free Exercise claim, in 
conjunction with another right, would warrant an exemption from an otherwise 
 
129 Id.; see also Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).  
130 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.  
131 Id. at 890.  
132 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993).  
133 546 U.S. 418 (2006).  
134 Id. at 436.  
135 Id. at 434 (quoting Brief for Petitioners 18).  
136 Id. at 435.  
137 Id.  
138 Merlino, supra note 46, at 686–87.   
139 Id. at 687; see also Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990) (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 
708 (1986)).   
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neutral and generally applicable law.140  Therefore, “two distinct but related claims . 
. . [may] . . . generate a hybrid” right requiring strict scrutiny.141   
The hybrid-rights approach was recognized by the D.C. Circuit in EEOC v. 
Catholic University of America.142  There, the court considered a claim by a Catholic 
nun that she was denied academic tenure on the basis of her sex in violation of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.143  The court rejected her claim, holding that a 
religious institution is afforded the authority “to select its own ministers free of 
government interference. . . .”144  In doing so, the court further recognized that there 
is “a long line of Supreme Court cases that affirm the fundamental right of churches 
to ‘decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government 
as well as those of faith and doctrine.’”145  Because enforcement of the civil rights 
law would require government inquiry into the internal governance practices of a 
religious institution, the court found that such entanglement would also implicate the 
Establishment Clause, thereby creating a hybrid situation in which strict scrutiny 
would be necessary.146   
Importantly, scholars have recognized that this suggests both an individual 
and institutional right to free exercise, and that a hybrid right may arise from the 
Religion Clauses themselves.147  Most recently, the Supreme Court effectively 
reiterated this institutional right to religious freedom in the 2012 case of Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC.148  In that case, the Court 
held that enforcement of the Americans with Disabilities Act against a church and 
parochial school violated the Free Exercise Clause because it “interfere[d] with the 
internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control over . . . its 
beliefs.”149  Such enforcement would also implicate the Establishment Clause, “which 
prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions” as those 
concerning the ministry of faith.150 
In addition to the right of institutional autonomy, scholars have identified 
another hybrid-rights exception concerning the interplay between the right to the free 
exercise of religion and the right to free speech, specifically the negative right of the 
individual not to speak.151  In West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,152 the 
Supreme Court held that Jehovah’s Witnesses could not be compelled to salute the 
American flag in public schools, as it was contrary to their sincerely held religious 
 
140 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.  
141 Merlino, supra note 46, at 690.  
142 Id. at 691; see also EEOC v. Cath. Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996).   
143 Cath. Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 459.  
144 Id. at 462.  
145 Id. (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 
116 (1952)).   
146 Merlino, supra note 46, at 692; see also Cath. Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 462-63.  
147 Merlino, supra note 46, at 692.   
148 Winters, supra note 9, at 195; see also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 
565 U.S. 171 (2012). 
149 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188.  
150 Id. at 189.  
151 Christopher R. Pudelski, Comment, The Constitutional Fate of Mandatory Reporting Statutes and the 
Clergy-Communicant Privilege in a Post-Smith World, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 724 (2004).  
152 W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).  
  




beliefs.153  Likewise, in Wooley v. Maynard,154 the Court ruled that motorists could 
not be compelled to display license plates with the phrase “Live Free or Die” because 
the state’s interest in that message was not sufficiently compelling to justify intrusion 
on the individual’s right not to speak in a way that conflicted with his sincerely held 
beliefs.155   
Yet another hybrid-rights exception may apply with respect to the right to 
the free exercise of religion and the right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Indeed, courts have recognized that “the constitutional right to privacy blankets the 
attorney-client relationship.”156  Likewise, the right to privacy is the modern rationale 
for the doctor-patient privilege.157  Insofar as the right to privacy undergirds the 
attorney-client and doctor-patient privileges, it would be perplexing to not find such 
an interplay in the clergy-penitent context.  Indeed, scholars have argued that the 
justifications for the clergy-penitent privilege are stronger than those for other 
evidentiary privileges.158  Furthermore, some scholars have posited that “while the 
clergy-penitent privilege may serve to protect free exercise of religion, it principally 
serves to protect an individual’s right to privacy.”159  This combination may provide 
another viable path through which to revive strict scrutiny in the context of the clergy-
penitent privilege.   
Regarding the Establishment Clause, the government may not pass 
legislation that has the purpose or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting 
religion.160  In this light, the Establishment Clause protects both religious and 
nonreligious individuals.161  In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court established a 
three-prong test for determining whether a government action violates the 
Establishment Clause.162  “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; 
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion”; and third, the “statute must not foster an excessive government 
entanglement with religion.”163   
Although the Court has applied variations of this test since its inception, a 
clear mandate with respect to its application does not yet exist.164  Instead, the Lemon 
factors are recognized as “helpful signposts.”165  Nevertheless, the Court has 
recognized that “[e]ach value judgment under the Religion Clauses must . . . turn on 
whether particular acts in question are intended to establish or interfere with religious 
 
153 Id. at 642.  
154 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).  
155 Id. at 716–17.  
156 Cantor v. Sup. Ct. of Pa., 353 F. Supp. 1307, 1319 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff’d, 487 F.2d 1394 (3d Cir. 1973).  
157 In re Miller, 585 N.E.2d 396, 408 (Ohio 1992).  
158 Shawn P. Bailey, How Secrets Are Kept: Viewing the Current Clergy-Penitent Privilege Through a 
Comparison with the Attorney-Client Privilege, 2002 B.Y.U. L. REV. 489, 511 (2002).  
159 Deborah Paruch, From Trusted Confidant to Witness for the Prosecution: The Case Against the 
Recognition of a Dangerous-Patient Exception to the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 9 U.N.H. L. REV. 327, 
391 (2011); see also Reese, supra note 71, at 60 (positing that the right to privacy may be one of the policy 
justifications for the privilege).  
160 Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).  
161 Winters, supra note 9, at 195–96.  
162 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).  
163 Id. at 612–13.  
164 Winters, supra note 9, at 196.  
165 Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).  
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beliefs and practices or have the effect of doing so.”166  In the recent aforementioned 
case of Hosanna-Tabor, the Court found a violation not only of the Free Exercise 
Clause, but also of the Establishment Clause, on the basis that it “prohibits 
government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions” as those pertaining to who 
will minister to the faithful and by what means.167  As discussed further infra Part 
IV.B, this could have significant implications for drafting a constitutional clergy-
penitent privilege statute that shows adequate deference to the mandated secrecy of 
penitential communications. 
 
ii.  Section 116 of the Australian Constitution  
 
Quite similarly, in Australia, Section 116 of its Constitution, which was 
drafted based on the religion clauses of the United States’ First Amendment itself,168 
provides for an Establishment Clause, Observance Clause, and Free Exercise 
Clause.169  Notably, however, where the First Amendment has been incorporated onto 
the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 116 of the Australian 
Constitution regrettably applies only to the Federal Commonwealth.170  Therefore, 
some say that Australian states are not expressly prohibited from infringing on 
religious exercise, establishing a religion, imposing religious observance, or 
exempting  religious individuals from public service.171   
Another notable distinction is that, where the free exercise of religion is an 
affirmative right in the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution, Section 116 
does not embody a freestanding right of the individual, but only a limitation against 
the legislative power of the Commonwealth.172  Further issues arise from the fact that 
while the First Amendment has been the subject of much litigation in the United 
States, a dearth of Section 116 cases exists in the High Court of Australia (“Court”), 
and it has never found a violation of that provision.173  In “the leading case” of 
Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Incorporated v Commonwealth, the Court 
considered a law which ordered property to be seized by the government in support 
of a war effort. 174  The Court decided the case on other grounds but stated in dicta 
that the “exercise” of religion was protected under Section 116, which included acts 
in pursuit of religious beliefs.175   
 
166 Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).  
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Today, the Australian High Court places particular emphasis on the purpose 
of the law when considering free exercise claims.176  In turn, the High Court has 
consistently held that a challenged law is valid under Section 116 unless its purpose 
is to establish a religion or prohibit the free exercise thereof.177  Thus, the High Court 
characteristically upholds neutral and generally applicable laws.178  In this light, the 
High Court’s approach is similar to that of the U.S. Supreme Court in Employment 
Division v. Smith, as previously discussed in Part I.C.  Indeed, in Kruger v 
Commonwealth,179 a justice of the Australian High Court cited Smith for the 
proposition that generally applicable laws are not subject to free exercise review and 
will be upheld with little scrutiny unless their purpose is to infringe religious 
freedom.180 
Notwithstanding the centrality of purpose in Section 116 cases, there has 
been disagreement in the High Court concerning how to determine whether 
legislation has been enacted for a “forbidden purpose.”181  In Kruger, the Court 
considered an ordinance which had aboriginal children removed from their homes.182  
While the majority of justices did not discern a forbidden purpose, Justice Gaudron 
argued that insofar as the law had the effect of preventing children from participating 
in their religious practices, a forbidden purpose could be inferred unless the 
government showed that it was necessary to achieve a compelling public interest 
unrelated to religion.183  In this light, Justice Gaudron effectively demonstrated a 
preference for a strict scrutiny approach similar to that of the Sherbert-Yoder line of 
cases in the United States.  
The purpose-centered analysis of the Australian High Court is still in flux, 
and with little litigation on the subject, how the Court would address the issue going 
forward remains unclear.  Notwithstanding this uncertainty, as evidenced by the 
Court’s use of Smith, the High Court strongly considers judicial developments in the 
United States.184  Therefore, as the United States Supreme Court continues to develop 
Smith and the hybrid-rights theory, the standard is likely to shift in Australia as well.   
 
II.  MODERN STATUTORY TREATMENT IN THE UNITED STATES & AUSTRALIA: 
CONFLICT BETWEEN THE CLERGY-PENITENT PRIVILEGE AND MANDATORY 
REPORTER STATUTES  
 
A.  MODERN TREATMENT IN THE UNITED STATES  
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Today, courts in the United States generally recognize the legitimacy of the 
clergy-penitent privilege.  Indeed, there exists a paucity of cases denying the existence 
of a common law clergy-penitent privilege in the United States.185  Although all fifty 
states and the federal government have come to recognize the privilege, they have 
done so on different grounds.  As discussed supra Part I.C, the federal government 
has done so by way of common law interpretation and reference to the proposed and 
rejected Rule 506.  In contrast, all fifty states have expressly passed statutes enacting 
some form of the clergy-penitent privilege.186  However, these states differ in terms 
of key statutory variables, including: (1) the definition of clergy; (2) the scope of the 
communications protected; (3) who may assert the privilege; and of paramount 
importance for purposes of this Note, (4) whether the privilege applies in cases of 
child abuse where a cleric’s duty to report under a mandatory reporter statute conflicts 
with his spiritual obligation as a sacramental mediator. 
Regarding the definition of “clergy,” about half of states define the term as, 
“a priest, minister, religious practitioner, or similar functionary of a church or of a 
religious denomination or religious organization.”187  Some states define clergy even 
more broadly by including the proposed and rejected Rule 506 language also covering 
any “individual reasonably believed” to be acting as such by the penitent.188  These 
liberal definitions of clergy ensure that the privilege is not unduly limited to certain 
religious groups, but they also arguably open the door to assertion of the privilege by 
persons who rightly may not be regarded as clergy in the ordinary sense of the word.  
In contrast, some states do not define the term clergy at all, but simply state the 
privilege will apply to any “‘clergyman or priest[,]’” thereby providing virtually no 
guidance on the privilege at all.189  Finally, the rest of the states have adopted a more 
restrictive approach, limiting the privilege to clergy of “‘bona fide established 
 
185 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 73.  
186 Varner v. Stovall, 500 F.3d 491, 495 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Mazza, supra note 6, at 182 n.75 (citing 
each state statute that codified the clergy-penitent privilege).  For example, the current Utah rule structures the 
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religious organization or an individual reasonably believed to be so by the 
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(2) “Confidential Communication” means a communication:  
(A) made privately; and 
(B) not intended for further disclosure except to other persons in 
furtherance of the purpose of the communication. 
(b) Statement of the Privilege. A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to 
prevent another from disclosing, any confidential communication:  
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(1) the person who made the confidential communication;  
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(3) the person’s personal representative if the person is deceased; and  
(4) the person who was the cleric at the time of the communication and on 
behalf of the communicant.  
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church[es] or religious organization[s].’”190  Therefore, these states limit the privilege 
to “bona fide clergy” in cognizable churches only.  This ensures that the privilege is 
not abused, but one may argue it is too limited insofar as there are colorable claims 
to the privilege by little–known denominations.  Until recently, Georgia had perhaps 
the most restrictive definition of clergy, defining it as “any Protestant minister of the 
Gospel, any priest of the Roman Catholic faith, [or] any priest of the Greek Orthodox 
faith.”191  Critics claimed this definition was unduly limited to the “major Western 
religions.”192  Therefore, Georgia undertook in 2011 to revise its definition of the 
privilege to include, among other things, the more expansive “similar functionary,” 
verbiage included in other state definitions.193  
In terms of the scope of the privilege, around half of U.S. states define it as 
covering “‘any confidential communication made to [a cleric] in his professional 
character.’”194  Importantly, this definition suggests that the communication need not 
be penitential in nature, so long as the cleric is acting in his “professional” capacity.  
Other states limit the privilege to “‘statement[s] made to [a cleric] under the sanctity 
of the religious confessional’” or within the “‘course of discipline enjoined by [a 
cleric’s] church.’”195  The effect of this restricted definition is to cover only those 
formal penitential communications which are under a mandate of secrecy by the 
religion in question, an approach which harkens back to the New York court’s 
decision in People v. Smith.   
With respect to who may assert the privilege, most states recognize the 
penitent as the sole holder of the privilege.196  Only four states specifically permit 
clergy to assert the privilege as well.197  However, if a penitent discloses the 
communication to a third party, then the right to assert the privilege is vitiated.198  In 
addition, some jurisdictions provide for waiver in certain circumstances.  For 
example, in Ohio, the penitent is the holder of the privilege, but he may waive the 
privilege through his consent unless the penitential communication was made 
“directly to the cleric” or “in the manner and context that places the cleric specifically 
and strictly under a level of confidentiality that is considered inviolate by canon law 
or church doctrine.”199 
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In addition to the clergy-penitent privilege, every state has a mandatory 
reporter statute aimed at discovering and stopping child abuse.200  However, states 
differ in terms of the classes of individuals enumerated as mandatory reporters and 
the scope of what must be reported.201  Today, over half of states have included 
members of the clergy as professionals who are required by law to report known or 
suspected child abuse and neglect.202  Of those states, twenty-four grant the privilege 
for those penitential communications that fall within the statutory definition.203  
Meanwhile, New Hampshire and West Virginia are the only states, along with the 
territory of Guam, to deny the privilege in cases involving child abuse or neglect.204  
Those two state statutes similarly provide, “[t]he privileged quality of communication 
between husband and wife and any professional person [including a priest, minister, 
or rabbi] and his patient or client, except that between attorney and client, shall not 
apply to proceedings [regarding child abuse and neglect].”205  However, of those 
states that do not expressly enumerate clergy as mandatory reporters but may 
nonetheless include them under the “any person” statutory designation, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Texas also deny the privilege in cases 
involving child abuse or neglect.206  Meanwhile, several states do not address the 
clergy-penitent privilege in their mandatory reporter laws at all.207 
The conflict between the clergy-penitent privilege and mandatory reporting 
law was most recently addressed in the 2016 Louisiana Supreme Court case of 
Mayeux v. Charlet.208  In that case, the parents of an alleged victim of sexual abuse 
named a Catholic priest among several defendants, claiming that he failed to comply 
with the state’s mandatory reporter statute after hearing of the alleged abuse during a 
sacramental confession.209  The Louisiana statute at issue enumerates clergy as 
mandatory reporters and defines the class as “any priest, rabbi, duly ordained clerical 
deacon or minister, Christian Science practitioner, or other similarly situated 
functionary of a religious organization . . . .”210  However, the statute preserved the 
clergy-penitent privilege, stating that “[a] member of the clergy is not required to 
report a confidential communication . . . [where] . . . under the discipline or tenets of 
that church, denomination, or organization, [the cleric] has a duty to keep such 
communications confidential.”211  The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that although 
clergy are mandatory reporters of child abuse, “a priest when administering the 
sacrament of confession has no duty to report any confidential communications made 
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during the confession that, by the tenets of the Roman Catholic Church, he is 
authorized to hear and is also duty bound to keep confidential.”212 
At the legislative level, states have become more active in attempting to alter 
judicial recognition of the clergy-penitent privilege in cases involving abuse.  At 
present, California, Utah, and North Dakota are among those states who grant the 
privilege where the penitential communication falls within the statutory definition.213  
However, legislators in each of those states have attempted to subordinate the 
privilege in cases involving child abuse in recent years.  Under existing law in 
California, clergy are enumerated as mandatory reporters and must report known or 
suspected instances of child abuse, except when the cleric acquires such knowledge 
or suspicion in the context of a penitential communication.214  In February 2019, State 
Senator Jerry Hill of California introduced S.B. 360 with the stated purpose of 
eliminating the “exception for a penitential communication, thereby requiring clergy 
to make a mandated report even if they acquired the knowledge or reasonable 
suspicion of child abuse or neglect during a penitential communication.”215  The 
effect of this bill would have been to abrogate the clergy-penitent privilege and thus 
compel clergy to choose between following state law and violating their sincerely 
held religious beliefs, or, in other words, following divine law and facing 
imprisonment.   
In May 2019, the California bill was amended, restating the purpose as intent 
on further defining “a penitential communication for purposes of the exception.  The 
bill would also exempt from the exemption any penitential communication made 
between a clergy member and another person employed at the same facility or 
location as that clergy member, or between a clergy member and another clergy 
member.”216  The effect of the bill as amended would still be to abrogate the privilege.  
However, it would limit the breadth of that abrogation to penitential communications 
between clergy and other religious institutional staff.  This is but a modest amendment 
that would nonetheless place clergy in a position wherein they would have to choose 
between state law and their religious conscience.  The effect of such language is that 
clergy and employees of religious institutions do not share the same right to 
confidential penitential communications as lay persons.  Such a formulation arguably 
implicates not only the Free Exercise Clause, but the Equal Protection Clause as well.     
A similar effort arose in Utah where, in 2020, State Representative Angela 
Romero introduced legislation intended to delete “provisions that exempt, under 
certain circumstances, a member of the clergy from being required to report child 
abuse and neglect.”217  Despite the fact that the statute already limited the privilege 
to those clergy whose religions required confidentiality regarding penitential 
communications, H.B. 90 sought to strike, in its entirety, language providing for a 
clergy-penitent privilege exception in cases of child abuse or neglect discovered 
during a sacramental confession.  Most recently, in January 2021, several state 
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senators and representatives in North Dakota introduced S.B. 2180, which would 
similarly abrogate the clergy-penitent privilege in cases of child abuse and neglect.218  
Currently, North Dakota law enumerates clergy as mandatory reporters but states that 
they are “not required to report . . . if the knowledge or suspicion is derived from 
information received in the capacity of spiritual adviser,” such as in the context of a 
penitential communication in the confessional.219   
Each of these legislative efforts stands to force clergy into the serious 
dilemma of choosing between facing prosecution and even imprisonment for 
violating the law or facing excommunication for violating a sincerely held religious 
belief.  Due to this grave implication for religious liberty, the California and North 
Dakota efforts were withdrawn and placed on temporary holds, while the Utah bill 
failed in the state house of representatives.220  In the wake of these legislative efforts, 
sentiments of discontent have echoed among religious liberty advocates who have 
said, “[i]n the United States, we expect to exercise our religion, including going to 
confession and having spiritual counseling, without government invading our 
privacy.”221 
 
B.  MODERN TREATMENT IN AUSTRALIA  
 
As discussed supra Part I.D, the clergy-penitent privilege has not received a 
great deal of recognition in Australian courts.  In the modern era, the issue has come 
up sparingly.  In 2008, the State Supreme Court of New South Wales considered a 
claim by the Mormon Church that a legal obligation to reveal the contents of a 
religious confession would violate Section 116 of the Australian Constitution.222  The 
State Supreme Court held, with little reasoning offered, that the law was not an 
unconstitutional infringement of the Free Exercise Clause.223  
From a legislative perspective, while recent efforts to abrogate the clergy-
penitent privilege have met resistance in the United States, such efforts have been 
successful in Australia.   Despite the fact that the Australian Law Reform Commission 
found an obligation to disclose evidence of confidential penitential communications 
“to be against the spirit of [Section] 116,”224 the Royal Commission into Institutional 
Responses to Child Sex Abuse recommended in its final report that the states’ 
mandatory reporting laws “should not exempt persons in religious ministry from 
being required to report knowledge or suspicions formed, in whole or in part, on the 
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basis of information disclosed in or in connection with a religious confession.”225  In 
response to this report, several Australian states acted quickly to modify their 
mandatory reporter laws and abrogate the clergy-penitent privilege in such cases.  
Queensland,226 Victoria,227 Tasmania,228 South Australia,229 and the Australian 
Capital Territory230 have passed legislation requiring priests to violate the seal of 
confession or face imprisonment. 
These legislative efforts have the effect of making clergy mandatory 
reporters of child abuse and abrogating the clergy-penitent privilege.  
Notwithstanding these threatened penalties, Catholic leadership in Australia has 
denounced these legislative efforts, with Archbishop Peter Comensoli of the 
Archdiocese of Melbourne saying he would rather go to jail than divulge the contents 
of a sacramental confession.231  This sentiment reflects the concerning dichotomy 
clergy face when legislatures abrogate the clergy-penitent privilege, namely, 
complying with the laws of the government and violating the dictates of their religion, 
or accepting prosecution for holding fast to their sincerely held religious beliefs.  
Therefore, an analysis as to the propriety of such a dichotomy is necessary. 
 
III.  THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RECENT LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES & AUSTRALIA  
 
A.  IN THE UNITED STATES  
 
Given that bills aimed at abrogating the clergy-penitent privilege have 
recently been proposed in California, Utah, and North Dakota, it is necessary to 
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evaluate whether the passage of such laws would run afoul of the First Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.  Based on Supreme Court jurisprudence respecting 
the Religion Clauses, such legislation likely stands to violate the Constitution.   
The first step under Smith is to decide whether the legislation in question may 
properly be characterized as neutral and generally applicable.  Under the Utah bill, 
the exemption for clergy is stricken from the statutory language such that “[a]ny 
individual who has reason to believe that a child has been subjected to abuse or 
neglect . . . shall immediately report the alleged abuse or neglect . . . .”232  In a similar 
way, the North Dakota bill eliminates the exemption for those spiritual 
communications previously covered by the privilege.  While this action may seem 
neutral and generally applicable on its face, the Supreme Court’s decision in O Centro 
makes clear that such governmental action demands strict scrutiny.  In that case, the 
Court emphasized the fact that there was a longstanding exemption for the use of 
hoasca such that the government needed to demonstrate a compelling interest for how 
maintaining the exemption stood to undercut the law in relation to the substantial 
burden imposed on that sacramental exercise.233  Indeed, the statutory exemption had 
existed for thirty–five years at the time of that case.234   
Here, the statutory exemptions for clergy-penitent communications in 
relation to the mandatory reporting laws of Utah and North Dakota have likewise 
existed for roughly three decades.235  This fact, coupled with the historical reverence 
with which the privilege has been viewed dating back centuries, suggests that these 
laws are not neutral and generally applicable and thus require strict scrutiny review.  
This is important because the government would then have to demonstrate how 
maintaining this long–respected privilege would undercut its ability to apprehend and 
prosecute suspected child abusers.  Insofar as the enactment of these laws would 
create an incentive structure that leads such abusers to simply avoid the confessional 
altogether, it is unlikely that the government could meet its burden.    
As introduced, the California bill was similar to the aforementioned 
legislation.236  As amended, the California bill maintained the privilege for penitential 
communications by the laity but not for penitential communications between the 
clergy.237  Additionally, the scope of the privilege was defined to apply only to those 
clergy “specifically and strictly under a level of confidentiality that is considered 
inviolate by church doctrine.”238  On this basis, the law is not even facially religion–
neutral or individual neutral, and thus likely fails under the Religion Clauses as well.  
In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,239 the Court considered 
whether an ordinance prohibiting animal sacrifices was constitutional.  It found that 
the words “sacrifice” and “ritual” used in the ordinance at issue supported the 
conclusion that the law was not religion neutral.240  Furthermore, it noted that the 
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effect of the law was “strong evidence of its object,” which it determined was to 
inhibit the practice of a particular religion, namely, Santeria.241   
Here, the California bill is not facially neutral.  Indeed, it makes an express 
distinction between clergy who hold secrecy of confession “inviolate” and those that 
do not.  Additionally, it accords a right to secrecy of penitential communications made 
by individual lay penitents but not those by clergy or other religious institutional 
employees.  For these reasons, it may be said that the law unduly targets certain 
religions as well as clergy and religious institutions generally—the former being 
targeted by virtue of the fact that it applies to religions who hold a seal “inviolate,” 
and the latter being targeted as unentitled to the same protections afforded the laity.  
The effect of such legislation would be to inhibit the practice of sacramental 
confessions and thus likely run afoul of the First Amendment.  Furthermore, as stated 
previously, such a construction would likely raise Equal Protection issues under the 
Fourteenth Amendment as well.      
Even if the California bill were accepted as neutral and generally applicable, 
the next step in the Smith analysis is to determine whether an exemption nonetheless 
applies to invoke strict scrutiny.  First, Smith recognized that legislation cannot extend 
individualized exemptions not afforded in circumstances of “religious hardship” 
without compelling justification.242  The California bill does exactly this by 
exempting the penitential communications or confessions of the laity at the exclusion 
of those by clergy and religious institutional staff.  Indeed, it is perhaps unfathomable 
to imagine a “religious hardship” more significant than facing immediate 
excommunication from one’s church.  The implication of the statutory language is 
that the legislature does not have an interest in curbing abuse generally, but rather, in 
apprehending suspect clergy specifically.  Furthermore, given that the bill targets 
faiths that hold the seal of confession inviolate, it may be said that the interest is even 
more narrowly aimed at the Catholic Church and other churches whose clergy have 
been in the news regarding child abuse.  Such discriminatory treatment “tends to 
exhibit hostility, not neutrality, towards religion,” thereby making strict scrutiny 
proper.243 
  Aside from these individual concerns, the D.C. Circuit’s decision in 
Catholic University and the Supreme Court’s holdings regarding the Religion Clauses 
in Hosanna-Tabor represent a shift towards an emphasis on the ability of organized 
religious institutions to govern their own internal affairs.244  Indeed, in Hosanna-
Tabor, the Court noted that Smith itself distinguished between legislation aimed at 
“physical acts,” like the use of peyote in that case, and legislation “lend[ing] its power 
to one or the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma.”245  
Therefore, the Court expressly stated that Smith would not apply in cases involving 
“an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself.”246  
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This means that “churches as institutions—wholly apart from the individual 
believer—may still claim exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause from otherwise 
generally applicable laws that encroach upon their autonomy, especially in matters of 
doctrine and church administration.”247  Here, legislative efforts to abrogate the 
clergy-penitent privilege very clearly encroach upon the doctrine embodied in the 
sacrament of Penance by demanding that the Church unseal the confessional.   
On this basis, even if these bills are neutral and generally applicable, to the 
extent they inhibit the free exercise of both the individual and the Church as an 
institution, the hybrid-rights theory of Smith applies.248  In this regard, legislative 
efforts to curb the clergy-penitent privilege affect the individual’s right to freely 
exercise his or her religion—whether lay or clergy—as well as the Church’s 
institutional autonomy in determining how to govern penitential communications 
generally without interference from the government.  Indeed, in the Catholic context, 
individual and institutional religious freedom are deeply intertwined.  It has been said 
that the seal of confession serves two purposes, the primary purpose being “protection 
of the religion itself, with the privacy of the individual penitent secondary to this.”249  
Moreover, the Catechism of the Catholic Church teaches that, in addition to 
conferring God’s grace upon the penitent, the sacrament revitalizes the “life of the 
Church which suffered from the sin of one of her members.”250  In this context, the 
clergy-penitent privilege is properly viewed as a mechanism which protects not only 
the free exercise of the individual penitent but also the institutional autonomy of the 
Church itself to effectuate its “authority and duty, conferred and commanded by 
Christ himself, to grant individual absolution. . . .”251  Therefore, laws like these, 
whether neutral and generally applicable or not, implicate the dual interests of 
individual religious freedom and church autonomy, thereby requiring strict scrutiny 
review. 
Likewise, the hybrid-rights exception for free speech and free exercise also 
likely applies.  The Court’s decisions in Barnette and Wooley show that compelled 
speech which contradicts one’s sincerely held beliefs may be subject to strict scrutiny 
review.  In Barnette, the Court stated that “[t]o sustain the compulsory flag salute we 
are required to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual’s right to speak 
his own mind, left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in 
his mind.”252  In his concurrence, Justice Murphy stated that to compel one to speak 
in a way that is contrary to one’s sincerely held religious beliefs is “the antithesis of 
freedom of worship.”253  Insofar as these bills obligate clergy to reveal the contents 
of sacred communications they are bound to hold secret under penalty of 
excommunication, compelling them to testify to such information equates to 
compelling them to not only speak against their faith but to abdicate it in its 
entirety.254  Furthermore, to do so is to reject the theological and practical teachings 
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of the Catholic faith.  Recall that, in Catholic theology, the priest is deemed to have 
“no mortal remembrance” of what is confessed because he stands in persona Christi 
as a mediator of a conversation between only the penitent and God.255  It is for this 
reason that, as a practical matter, seminarians are taught to treat a penitential 
communication as though “it never happened.”256   
Finally, a novel hybrid-rights exception may also be viable concerning the 
relationship between the right to freely exercise religion and the right to privacy under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Such a hybrid has not been expressly recognized in the 
courts.  However, its acceptance as the foundational right upon which the evidentiary 
privileges of attorney-client and doctor-patient are based suggests that it may be 
similarly supported in the clergy-penitent context.  Insofar as the hybrid-rights 
exception to Smith applies on one of the aforementioned bases, the constitutionality 
of these bills returns to a strict scrutiny analysis.   
Under Sherbert, Yoder, and their progeny, the Supreme Court has said that 
the government must demonstrate a compelling interest that outweighs the substantial 
burden imposed on religious exercise.  In Yoder, the Court evaluated whether a law 
that compelled all parents to cause their children to attend secondary school or pay a 
fine violated the free exercise right of Amish parents.257  The Court said that “a State’s 
interest . . . however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process 
when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically 
protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment . . . .”258  Thus, “only 
those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served” can overcome a 
legitimate claim to the free exercise of religion.259  The Court held that although the 
state’s interest in education was arguably a strong one, it could not overcome the right 
of the defendants to freely exercise their religion.   
In its analysis, the Court found that the law imposed a substantial burden on 
religious practice, stating that a law does so when it “affirmatively compels 
[someone], under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with 
fundamental tenets of [his] religious beliefs.”260  Indeed, the Court said that “almost 
300 years of consistent practice, and strong evidence of sustained faith pervading and 
regulating respondents’ entire mode of life support the claim that . . . [the law] . . . 
would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of [the Amish’s] religious 
beliefs.”261  The Court also accorded great weight to the notion that the state’s interest 
would still be served even if the Amish children did not attend school beyond the age 
of sixteen because they were taught how to be self-reliant and equipped with technical 
skills valuable to society.262   
The same could be said of the issues posed by state efforts to subordinate the 
clergy-penitent privilege to mandatory reporter statutes.  First, it is evident that these 
legislative efforts stand to impose a substantial burden on religious practice insofar 
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as clerics would be subject to a dichotomous choice between following the dictates 
of their religion or facing not just a mere fine but imprisonment for refusing to violate 
the seal of confession.  Furthermore, like the Amish, whose faith would be annihilated 
in the face of the compulsory school attendance law, these bills stand to vitiate a 
critical pillar of the Catholic faith—one of the seven sacraments of the Church.  The 
Yoder court perhaps prophetically drew a parallel between the interests of the Amish 
and Catholics saying, “the Amish mode of life and education is inseparable from and 
a part of the basic tenets of their religion . . . as much a part of their religious belief 
and practices as . . . the confessional . . . for others.”263  Indeed, as discussed supra 
Part I.A, the sacrament of Penance is an indispensable part of the Catholic faith with 
its origin in the words of Jesus Christ himself, who said to his Apostles, “[i]f you 
forgive the sins of any, they are forgiven them; if you retain the sins of any, they are 
retained.”264   
Although there is arguably a compelling state interest in obtaining evidence 
that will further prosecutorial efforts against suspected child abusers, strict scrutiny 
requires legislatures to demonstrate how removing the clergy-penitent privilege 
would achieve the goal of curbing child abuse.  This is a burden the government is 
likely incapable of meeting because statutes that abrogate the clergy-penitent are 
based upon a false premise, namely, that the privilege enables child abuse, and that 
abrogation would diminish its prevalence.265  As scholars rightly point out, 
knowledge and reason suggest that abrogation of the privilege will lead perpetrators 
to simply avoid the confessional altogether, thus eliminating any chance of 
rehabilitation or restoration that may be possible through a penitential 
communication.266   
In this light, it would be wrong to suggest that the government interest is not 
otherwise served in the absence of legislation which abrogates the clergy-penitent 
privilege.  Indeed, maintaining the confidential nature of penitential communications 
serves desirable social goals.  Foremost among these goals, it provides a mechanism 
through which individuals are encouraged to admit fault and seek forgiveness as well 
as counsel concerning how to avoid such wrongdoing in the future.267  In this light, it 
fosters reconciliation between the penitent, victim, and community as a whole.  In the 
Catholic context, this is achieved by the acts of penance which the penitent is directed 
to complete to “expiate” his sins.268  As discussed supra Part I.A, this can take a 
number of forms, but “[o]ne must do what is possible in order to repair the harm.”269  
For example, one may be directed to “return stolen goods, restore the reputation of 
someone slandered, [or] pay compensation for injuries.”270  Insofar as these directives 
mirror many equitable and legal remedies, the privilege stands not only to further the 
important social interest in freedom of religion, but also serves the state’s interest in 
promoting justice and reconciliation with society. 
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In sum, the recent legislative proposals of California, Utah, and North Dakota 
violate the First Amendment by placing clergy in a position wherein they must choose 
between violating their sincerely held religious beliefs or face criminal prosecution.  
For these reasons, it is perhaps unsurprising that those bills have stalled or failed in 
the face of steep opposition from not only religious communities, but indeed, those 
legislators who are “committed to American political values.”271 
 
B.  IN AUSTRALIA  
 
As discussed supra Part I.E.ii, legislative efforts to eradicate the clergy-
penitent privilege have been highly successful in Australian states and have not 
received much attention from litigants.  This is likely because the Australian states 
are not bound by the Federal Constitution.  Furthermore, the High Court’s purpose-
centered approach has led it to consistently reject Section 116 claims.  
Notwithstanding this pattern, legislation aimed at abrogating the clergy-penitent 
privilege differs significantly from past Section 116 challenges.  Therefore, if similar 
legislation is adopted by the Commonwealth, then it may pose the first Section 116 
violation.  In Krygger v Williams,272 the High Court considered a Section 116 
challenge in which the plaintiff argued that compulsory military service was 
unconstitutional because it infringed upon his religious beliefs.273  In rejecting this 
argument, Justice Griffith said, “[t]o require a man to do a thing which has nothing at 
all to do with religion is not prohibiting him from a free exercise of religion.”274  The 
implication is that legislation that compels an individual to breach the dictates of his 
faith, as in the case of a priest compelled to violate the seal of confession, would 
constitute a free exercise violation.275  Nevertheless, the purpose test poses a 
significant obstacle.   
In Kruger v Commonwealth, the High Court considered a Section 116 
challenge to an ordinance that had children removed from their homes and placed 
under the legal guardianship of the government.  The plaintiffs argued that the forcible 
removal of children from the aboriginal community effectively impaired the free 
exercise of religion.276  Five justices held that the ordinance did not violate Section 
116, in large part because a forbidden purpose could not be discerned from the 
language of the ordinance.277  Indeed, the ordinance at issue in that case made no 
mention whatsoever of religion or any other belief systems at all.278  Thus, it may 
legitimately be said that there was only an incidental effect on religion.  However, the 
same is not true in the context of some Australian statutes which have abrogated the 
clergy-penitent privilege.  For example, in the Children Legislation Amendment Act 
2019, the Parliament of Victoria expressly stated that its “main purposes” were to 
“include persons in religious ministry as mandatory reporters . . . and . . . to clarify 
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that a [cleric] is not able to rely on the religious confession privilege . . . to avoid the 
reporting requirement.”279  In this light, the legislative purpose very clearly targets 
the free exercise of religion on its face insofar as Australian legislatures are cognizant 
of the confessional seal.  Therefore, such legislation is much more likely to be deemed 
unconstitutional if passed by the Commonwealth. 
 
IV.  PROPOSAL FOR A UNIFORM GLOBAL APPROACH TO THE CLERGY-
PENITENT PRIVILEGE  
 
A.  WHY A UNIFORM APPROACH IS APPROPRIATE  
 
The conflict between the clergy-penitent privilege and mandatory reporter 
statutes has been reconciled in a multitude of ways at both the national and 
international levels, resulting in disparate implications for clergy depending on the 
jurisdiction within which they reside.  Insofar as many religious denominations span 
the globe and the clerical profession is among the most mobile,280 scholars have noted 
that it seems appropriate––and perhaps necessary––to implement a more uniform 
approach to the privilege.  In the Catholic Church alone, there are more than 400,000 
clergy worldwide along with a population of more than 1.3 billion believers.281  The 
various approaches to the privilege foster a lack of clarity among the clergy regarding 
an already complicated subject matter, while also raising the potential for conflict of 
law issues where a cleric has been transferred from one jurisdiction to another.282  
While legislatures are sure to differ on particular details concerning the appropriate 
drafting of the privilege, the current state of the law suggests that legislatures have 
failed to strike a balance between these competing interests in favor of religious 
liberty on the one hand or effective criminal prosecution on the other.  To adequately 
balance these issues, careful consideration of who may assert the privilege and the 
extent to which it is available is paramount.  
 
B.  DEFINING CLERGY & LIMITING WHO MAY ASSERT THE PRIVILEGE  
 
In attempting to draft a uniform statutory formulation of the clergy-penitent 
privilege, it is necessary to decide who will be able to assert it.  As discussed supra 
Part II.A, statutory definitions of clergy vary significantly.  Some jurisdictions have 
defined clergy broadly, seeking to craft a less formalistic and more inclusive 
definition that is not unduly limited to Western religions nor particular religious 
actors.  Others have opted for a more restrictive definition in which formalistic, 
contextual considerations play a much greater role.  Likewise, states vary in terms of 
whether the privilege is held by the cleric, penitent, or both.  Of course, the balance 
which must be struck is between unduly limiting the privilege to the benefit of 
particular religions and individuals on the one hand, versus leaving the door open to 
potential abuse by laypersons and inapposite religions on the other.  
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 To best account for the free exercise interests at stake, the clergy-penitent 
privilege should afford protection to both clergyman and penitent alike.  Some 
scholars have argued that the privilege should be held by the penitent only.283  
Specifically, it is argued that the public policy which underlies the clergy-penitent 
privilege is not materially different from that of other evidentiary privileges such as 
the attorney-client and doctor-patient privileges, namely, to protect and foster open 
communication by the client, patient, or penitent.284  This argument neglects the 
fundamental interest at stake for the cleric that is wanting for attorneys and doctors, 
namely, the cleric’s ability to freely exercise his religion in a manner equally worthy 
of protection as that of the penitent.  In this light, the clergy-penitent privilege is more 
akin to the spousal privilege, which generally affords the ability to exercise and waive 
the privilege to both spouses due to the recognition that both parties will generally 
have a vested interest in maintaining the confidentiality of their communications.285  
As discussed supra Part I.A, the clergy-penitent privilege was born out of 
early church teaching concerning the mandated secrecy of penitential 
communications which is today codified in the Canon Law of the Catholic Church.  
Insofar as clergy are subject to excommunication for violating the seal of confession, 
their fundamental religious liberty interest in keeping the contents of penitential 
communications from judicial revelation is manifest.  To require a cleric to divulge 
the contents of such communications is to inhibit his ability to freely exercise his 
religious belief, pitting his sincerely held religious beliefs against the state’s law.  
Therefore, both the cleric and penitent should hold the privilege.  This encourages 
open and honest communication by the penitent and fosters trust in the confidentiality 
of those communications, while also recognizing the cleric’s concurrent and 
independent obligation to refrain from divulging the contents of penitential 
communications.      
Concerning the availability of the privilege among the clergy, due 
consideration must be given to the fact that under the Establishment Clause, 
preferential treatment may not be given to particular religions or to religion over non-
religion.  It has been posited that restrictive definitions which extend the privilege 
only to certain “recognized,” “bona fide,” or “regularly established” religions could 
constitute preferential treatment for the most widely practiced Western religious 
traditions, with Christian denominations foremost among them.286  Likewise, it has 
been said that statutes that protect only those religions that mandate secrecy of 
penitential communications or delineate particular religious actors such as a “priest, 
rabbi, accredited Christian Science practitioner, or a clergyman or ordained minister 
of an established church” may run afoul of the Establishment Clause.287  The 
argument is that such a definition unduly favors Catholicism and other faith traditions 
whose clergy are bound by the seal of confession.288   
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Interestingly, this argument implicitly recognizes a critical aspect of the 
equally important and perhaps more apt free exercise considerations at play.  These 
considerations are applicable only to those faiths that the privilege is intended to 
protect, namely, those with a sincerely held religious belief in the mandated secrecy 
of penitential communications.  It would be inconsistent with the history and purpose 
of the privilege to insert such a belief into the exercise of other religious traditions.  
Insofar as other religious denominations do not recognize confidential penitential 
communications as an element of their faith, deprivation of the privilege does not 
constitute preferential treatment of one religion over another but is instead a 
recognition of the realities concerning a belief and practice that is not relevant to all 
religions.  Indeed, courts have recognized that consideration of a religious 
“organization’s ecclesiastical rules, customs and laws . . . avoid[s] denominational 
favoritism and is consistent with the aims of the clergy-penitent privilege.”289 
Any definition of the clergy-penitent privilege must account for these 
historical and theological realities, namely, that the mandated secrecy of the 
confessional undergirds the existence of the privilege itself.  Therefore, a definition 
that extends the privilege to a mere “spiritual adviser” or any “individual reasonably 
believed” to be acting as such unduly broadens the privilege in a manner that renders 
it open to abuse by persons whose religion does not hold a sincere belief in the secrecy 
of penitential communications.  In fact, scholars have argued that a failure to limit the 
privilege in this way elevates religion over non-religion by enabling actors whose 
religions lack a mandate of secrecy to benefit from the privilege in a manner 
unavailable to secular individuals, notwithstanding the fact that each would lack a 
legitimate basis upon which to assert its necessity.290  Therefore, a proper definition 
of clergy will restrict its availability to those individuals who are bound by the dictates 
of their religion to hold penitential communications in confidence.  Furthermore, the 
privilege should be made available only to bona fide clergy.  While some scholars 
have argued that this is unduly restrictive, this limitation furthers the well-settled 
notion that evidentiary privileges are to be drafted and construed “no more broadly 
than necessary to accomplish their basic purposes.”291   
In addition to the goal of fostering open and honest communication between 
penitents and clergy, some of the basic purposes that have been recognized 
concerning the clergy-penitent privilege include promoting or preventing the 
government from inhibiting the free exercise of one’s religion, individual 
communication with one’s God, the right to privacy, and the therapeutic value 
associated with confessional activities.292  Concerning this last purpose, English jurist 
and utilitarian philosopher, Jeremy Bentham, said that although there are some 
situations in which it would be beneficial to gain access to the contents of these 
confidential penitential communications, “there are others in which the disclosures 
thus made are actually of use to justice, under the assurance of their never reaching 
the ears of the judge.  Repentance and consequent abstinence from further misdeeds 
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of the like nature” are among those benefits which flow from confidential penitential 
communications.293  Insofar as the law recognizes these policy goals as valuable, it is 
critical that the privilege be drafted in such a way as to effectuate these changes.  Just 
as it may be said that extension of the privilege to laypersons such as friends, family, 
or coworkers would run afoul of these policy goals, so too may it be said of a 
formulation which extends the privilege to any “individual reasonably believed” to 
be acting as a religious functionary. 
    
C.  DEFINING THE SCOPE: BALANCING STATE INTERESTS IN CHILD ABUSE AGAINST 
LEGITIMATE RELIGIOUS PRACTICE  
 
Having established who may assert the privilege, it is necessary to determine 
the bounds within which the privilege will be available.  Clearly, a legitimate 
expectation of confidentiality is a requisite condition for recognition of any 
testimonial privilege.294  Beyond this, however, jurisdictions again differ significantly 
in terms of where they draw the line concerning the scope of the privilege.  Many 
statutes extend the privilege to “any confidential communication” made to a member 
of the clergy in his “professional character.”295  The problem with this formulation is 
that it once again neglects the historical and theological context in which the clergy-
penitent privilege was adopted, namely, to protect those communications for which 
there is a mandate of secrecy incumbent upon the cleric.  Such a formulation again 
expands the reach of the privilege in a way that opens the door to its abuse. 
To limit and preserve the privilege as well as the purposes which underlie it, 
its scope should not extend beyond those communications which a bona fide 
clergyman is enjoined from disclosing under the discipline of his church.  This 
approach comports with other evidentiary privileges such as the attorney-client and 
doctor-patient privileges insofar as they are backed by an objective, professional 
obligation to maintain the confidentiality of particular communications.296  In the 
absence of a specific religious dictate to maintain the secrecy of communications, the 
rationale for a professional obligation of clergy to keep the contents of such 
communications secret is wanting.  This again raises an Establishment Clause concern 
insofar as extension of the privilege to religions who lack a sincere belief in the 
necessity for confidential penitential communications may be viewed as elevation of 
religion over non-religion where both are bereft of any objective basis upon which to 
assert the necessity of the privilege.297  For the same reason, the privilege should not 
extend beyond religiously motivated communications such as penitential 
communications.   
Scholars have rightly pointed out that statutes which include language 
protecting “any confidential communication” received by clergy in their 
“professional capacity” provide little guidance as to what that includes, or perhaps 
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more importantly for abuse prevention, what it does not include.298  Individuals may 
seek and clergy may provide counsel in numerous ways, both secular and religious.  
In its comments to the Children’s Code Article 603, the Louisiana legislature 
explained that it limited the scope of the privilege to only those circumstances in 
which a cleric is acting exclusively in his spiritual counseling capacity, under a duty 
to keep such “sacrosanct and nondisclosable” communications confidential, to 
prevent it from being abused where he was acting in a merely administrative, 
supervisory, or secular counseling capacity.299  Indeed, where a cleric is acting in one 
of these latter capacities, the necessity for the clergy-penitent privilege is wanting.  
Therefore, a proper formulation of the privilege should emphasize the type of 
communication the individual is engaging in with his or her cleric.  In this regard, 
only those penitential communications in which the penitent seeks religious or 
spiritual guidance should be privileged.   
Importantly, this does not speak to the gravity of the wrongdoing in question, 
but rather, the purpose for which the communication is made.  For example, it has 
been held that the mere fact of an individual telling a clergy member he intends to 
commit a criminal act will not inure protection under the clergy-penitent privilege 
where the statement is not made for the purpose of obtaining spiritual guidance.300  
Therefore, a proper definition would give protection to those penitential 
communications made to a cleric for the purpose of obtaining religious or spiritual 
guidance according to the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which he 
belongs.  This ensures that the privilege is rightly limited to those religions which 
mandate the secrecy of such communications and prevents it from being applied 
beyond those narrow circumstances for which the privilege was adopted.  
Concerning the relationship between the privilege and mandatory reporter 
statutes, the seal of confession must remain of paramount importance.  A plethora of 
various arguments have been put forth, ranging from unsealing the confessional in its 
entirety to strictly maintaining the confidentiality of such penitential communications, 
irrespective of the contents in question.  The latter approach is the only one that can 
truly account for the right to freely exercise one’s religion in the penitential 
communication context.  Some scholars have argued for a “partial abrogation” 
approach, in which clergy would be required to meet their obligation to report, but 
that the reported information could not be used in a court of law against an alleged 
perpetrator absent a source independent of the otherwise-privileged clergy-penitent 
communication.301   
While this approach attempts to strike a balance between the competing 
interests at stake, it nevertheless fails to adequately account for the free exercise 
considerations at play for the individual as well as the Church as an institution.  In the 
Catholic Church, the seal of confession “admits of no exceptions.”302  Indeed, the 
canon law states that a priest must preserve the seal “even when all danger of 
disclosure is excluded.”303  For these reasons, the conflict between the clergy-penitent 
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privilege and mandatory reporter statutes should be drawn to protect the integrity of 
the privilege.  Insofar as the religious liberty interests are legitimate and the 
preservation of the confessional seal is indispensable to protecting those interests, a 
statute that subordinates the privilege would run afoul of the internationally 
recognized human right to freely exercise religion. 
 
 CONCLUSION  
 
The increasing efforts to curb the clergy-penitent privilege are an alarming 
affront to the internationally recognized right to the free exercise of religion.  The seal 
of confession upon which the privilege is based is a centuries-old pillar of Roman 
Catholicism and other faith traditions that is held sacrosanct in belief and practice.  
The scriptural basis for the sacrament, early church teaching, and centuries of ardent 
support for the confidentiality of penitential communications from both the secular 
and religious spheres evidences its indispensable nature.  While legislatures in the 
United States and Australia have attempted to abrogate the privilege, this Note has 
demonstrated the significant likelihood that such enactments are unconstitutional in 
both jurisdictions.   
Notwithstanding the shift in First Amendment jurisprudence after Smith, 
many avenues to resurrect strict scrutiny remain viable with respect to the hybrid-
rights exception.  Under such an analysis, it is likely that these legislative efforts 
would not pass constitutional muster.  This is due to the manifest religious liberty 
implications at stake when a cleric is faced with a dichotomous choice between 
excommunication or prosecution, as well as the practical limitations to achieving the 
asserted governmental interests.  Likewise, although the High Court of Australia has 
never found a Section 116 violation, legislation expressly and purposely directed at 
this religious belief and practice such as that of the State of Victoria could pave the 
way for the first such violation if passed by the Commonwealth.  Furthermore, insofar 
as the Supreme Court continues to evaluate the hybrid-rights theory of Smith, the 
Australian High Court may alter its approach as it is faced with new challenges.  
 This Note has echoed prior scholars and further provided a guiding 
framework for drafting a uniform privilege that assuredly protects the sanctity of 
confidential penitential communications while narrowing the universe of individuals 
who may assert the privilege as well as the scope of the communications covered.  
Commensurate with the history of the privilege and its underpinnings, the privilege 
should be limited to bona fide clergy who are under a mandate of secrecy regarding 
penitential communications.  Furthermore, it should cover only those penitential 
communications for which the penitent seeks religious or spiritual guidance from a 
cleric acting in his professional capacity as enjoined by the discipline of his church.  
This serves to limit the privilege to confidential penitential communications and 
prevent individuals who lack a sincere belief in the necessity for such from asserting 
it, while also giving due deference to its indispensability for those faiths who hold it 
inviolate and would be thus substantially burdened without it.   
While this Note argues against subordinating the privilege to mandatory 
reporter statutes, there is clearly a manifest interest in preventing and prosecuting 
child abuse.  It is evident that the Church has failed in many regards, and institutional 
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changes from the inside out are necessary to ensure that clergy are adequately trained 
to counsel penitents regarding the means through which the ends of justice and mercy 
may be best served.  With properly drafted legislation and thorough institutional 
reform, legislatures and churches alike can work in tandem to address child abuse and 
protect legitimate religious practice.  
